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An abstract argumentation framework can be used to model the argumentative stance of an agent
at a high level of abstraction, by indicating for every pair of arguments that is being considered
in a debate whether the first attacks the second. When modelling a group of agents engaged in a
debate, we may wish to aggregate their individual argumentation frameworks to obtain a single such
framework that reflects the consensus of the group. Even when agents disagree on many details, there
may well be high-level agreement on important semantic properties, such as the acceptability of a
given argument. Using techniques from social choice theory, we analyse under what circumstances
such semantic properties agreed upon by the individual agents can be preserved under aggregation.
1 Introduction
Formal argumentation theory provides tools for modelling both the arguments an agent may wish to
employ in a debate and the relationships that hold between such arguments [4, 22, 23]. In the widely
used system of abstract argumentation, introduced in the seminal work of Dung [11], we abstract away
from the internal structure of arguments and only model whether or not one argument attacks another
argument. This is a useful perspective when we require a high-level understanding of how different
arguments relate to each other. But when several agents engage in a debate, they may differ on their
assessment of some of the arguments and their relationships. How best to model such scenarios of
collective argumentation is a question of considerable interest. Over the past decade or so, several
authors have started to contribute to its resolution (see, e.g., [1, 5, 7, 8, 9, 13, 24, 25]).
Specifically, when agents differ on their assessment of which attacks between the arguments are in
fact justified, i.e., when they put forward different attack-relations, we may wish to aggregate these indi-
vidual pieces of information to obtain a global view. In this paper, we analyse under what circumstances
a given aggregation rule will preserve relevant properties of the individual attack-relations, particularly
properties that relate to the various semantics that have been proposed for abstract argumentation. For
example, if all agents agree that argument A is acceptable, either because it is not attacked by any other
argument or because it can be successfully defended against any such attack, then we would like A to also
be considered acceptable relative to the attack-relation returned by our aggregation rule. Thus, argument
acceptability is an example for a property that, ideally, should be preserved under aggregation.
Our approach uses techniques originating in social choice theory, the study of collective decision
making [2, 16], the relevance of which to collective argumentation has previously been noted by several
of the aforementioned authors, starting with Tohme´ et al. [25]. In particular, we make use of recent results
on graph aggregation [14]. Besides the formulation of a clear and simple model for the axiomatic study
of the preservation of semantic properties during aggregation, our contribution consists in delineating
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how fundamental axiomatic properties of aggregation rules interact with such preservation requirements.
Our technical results range from characterisation results that indicate what kind of aggregation rule can
satisfy certain combinations of desiderata, to impossibility results that show that only aggregation rules
that are clearly unacceptable from an axiomatic point of view (namely, so-called dictatorships) can pre-
serve the most demanding semantic properties.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 is a brief review of relevant concepts from the theory
of abstract argumentation. Section 3 introduces our model and Section 4 present our technical results on
the preservation of semantic properties under aggregation. Finally, we discuss related work in Section 5
and conclude, in Section 6, with suggestions for possible directions for future work.
2 Abstract Argumentation
In this section, we recall some of the fundamentals of abstract argumentation as originally introduced by
Dung [11]. An argumentation framework is a pair AF= 〈Arg,⇀〉, where Arg is a finite set of arguments
and ⇀ is an irreflexive binary relation on Arg.1 If A⇀ B holds for two arguments A,B ∈ Arg, we say
that A attacks B. An attack-relation (⇀) ⊆ Arg×Arg is made up of a set of attacks att ∈ Arg×Arg.
For a set of arguments ∆ ⊆ Arg and an argument B ∈ Arg, we say that ∆ attacks B, denoted as ∆ ⇀ B, if
A⇀ B holds for some argument A∈∆. Given an argumentation framework AF, the question arises which
arguments to accept. For example, we may not want to accept two arguments that attack each other. A
semantics for abstract argumentation specifies which sets of arguments can be accepted together. Any
such set of arguments is called an extension of AF under the semantics in question.
For all the definitions of specific choices of semantics that follow, consider an arbitrary but fixed
argumentation framework AF= 〈Arg,⇀〉 and a set of arguments ∆ ⊆ Arg. We say that ∆ is conflict-free,
if there exist no arguments A,B∈∆ such that A⇀ B. We further say that ∆ defends the argument B∈Arg,
if ∆ ⇀ A for all arguments A ∈ Arg such that A⇀ B. Finally, ∆ is called admissible if it is conflict-free
and defends every single one of its members.
Definition 1. A stable extension of AF is a conflict-free set ∆ of arguments in Arg that attacks every
other argument B ∈ Arg\∆.
Definition 2. A preferred extension of AF is an admissible set of arguments in Arg that is maximal with
respect to set inclusion.
Definition 3. A complete extension of AF is an admissible set of arguments in Arg that includes all of
the arguments it defends.
The characteristic function of AF is the function fAF : 2
Arg → 2Arg with fAF : ∆ 7→ {A ∈ Arg |
∆ defends A}, mapping any given set of arguments in Arg to the set of arguments it defends.
Definition 4. The grounded extension of AF is the least fixed point of its characteristic function fAF.
We can compute the grounded extension ∆ by initialising ∆ with the empty set /0 and then repeatedly
executing the program ∆ := fAF(∆), until no more changes occur. Unlike for the other three semantics,
there always is exactly one grounded extension. However, that extension may be empty. It is nonempty
if and only if there is at least one unattacked argument.
How do these semantics relate to each other? Every stable extension is also a preferred extension.
The set of stable extensions may be empty, while there always is at least one preferred extension. Every
1Neither the finiteness nor the irreflexivity assumption are crucial for our results, but they simplify exposition and clearly
are natural for most applications.
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Figure 1: Example for a profile with Arg= {A,B,C,D}.
preferred extension is also a complete extension. Finally, the grounded extension is always a complete
extension as well.
An interesting question is under what circumstances two or more semantics coincide. Probably the
clearest example is the case of an acyclic attack-relation: if ⇀ does not include any cycles, then the
grounded extension is also the only stable extension, the only preferred extension, and the only complete
extension. A weaker condition is coherence: AF is called coherent if every preferred extension of AF is
stable, i.e., if the two semantics coincide.
3 The Model
Fix a finite set of arguments Arg. Let N = {1, . . . ,n} be a finite set of n agents. Suppose each agent
i ∈ N supplies us with an argumentation framework AFi = 〈Arg,⇀i〉, reflecting her individual views
on the status of possible attacks between arguments. Thus, we are given a profile of attack-relations
⇀ = (⇀1, . . . ,⇀n).
2 What would be a good method of aggregating these individual argumentation
frameworks to arrive at a single argumentation framework that appropriately reflects the views of the
group as a whole? This is the central question we address in this paper. An aggregation rule is a function
F : (Arg×Arg)n → Arg×Arg mapping any given profile of attack-relations into a single attack-relation.
Example 1. The first aggregation rule that comes to mind is the majority rule: include attack A⇀ B
in the outcome if and only if a (weak) majority of the individual agents do. If we apply this rule to the
profile shown in Figure 1, we obtain an argumentation framework with A⇀ B, B⇀C, and C⇀ A. △
In the remainder of this section, we first define a number of specific aggregation rules and review
their properties. We focus on simple rules that are adaptations of well-known rules used in the social
choice literature, particularly in judgment aggregation [17] and graph aggregation [14]. We then adapt
several standard properties of aggregation rules, known as axioms in that same literature, to our setting.
Finally, we review several semantic properties of argumentation frameworks and formulate the question
of whether a given rule will preserve such a property.
3.1 Aggregation Rules
Recall that an aggregation rule is a function F , mapping any given profile ⇀ = (⇀1, . . . ,⇀n) ∈ (Arg×
Arg)n of attack-relations to a single attack-relation F(⇀)⊆ Arg×Arg. We sometimes write (A⇀ B) ∈
F(⇀) for (A,B) ∈ F(⇀). We use N⇀att := {i ∈ N | att ∈ (⇀i)} to denote the set of supporters of the
attack att in profile⇀.
2Note that we assume that all agents report an attack-relation over the same set of arguments Arg. As argued by Coste-
Marquis et al. [8], generalisations, where different agents may be aware of different subsets of Arg, are possible and interesting,
but—in line with most existing work in the area—we shall not explore them here.
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Definition 5. Let q ∈ {1, . . . ,n}. The quota rule Fq with quota q accepts all those attacks that are
supported by at least q agents:
Fq(⇀) = {att ∈ Arg×Arg | #N
⇀
att > q}
The weak majority rule is the quota rule Fq with q= ⌊
n
2
⌋ and the strict majority rule is the quota rule
Fq with q = ⌈
n
2
⌉. Two further quota rules are also of special interest. The unanimity rule only accepts
attacks that are supported by everyone, i.e., this is Fq with q = n. The nomination rule is the quota rule
Fq with q= 1. Despite being a somewhat extreme choice, the nomination rule has some intuitive appeal
in the context of argumentation, as it reflects the idea that we should take seriously any conflict between
arguments raised by at least one member of the group.
Definition 6. Let C ∈ 2N \ { /0} be a nonempty coalition of agents. The oligarchic rule FC accepts all
those attacks that are accepted by all members of C:
FC(⇀) = {att ∈ Arg×Arg |C ⊆ N
⇀
att}
Thus, any member of the oligarchy C can veto an attack from being accepted. Observe that the una-
nimity rule can also be characterised as the oligarchic rule FC with C = N. A subclass of the oligarchic
rules are the dictatorships. The dictatorship of dictator i∈N is the oligarchic rule FC withC= {i}. Thus,
under a dictatorship, to compute the outcome, we simply copy the attack-relation of the dictator. Intu-
itively speaking, oligarchic rules, and dictatorships in particular, are unattractive rules, as they unfairly
exclude everyone not inC from the decision process.
Some rules combine features of the quota rules and the oligarchic rules. For example, we may choose
to accept an attack only if it is accepted by (i) a weak majority of all agents and (ii) a small number of
distinguished agents to which we want to give the right to veto attacks. Such rules (sometimes called
qualified majority rules) are certainly more attractive than the oligarchic rules, but they are still unfair in
the sense of granting some agents more influence than others.
Definition 7. Agent i∈N has veto powers under aggregation rule F, if F(⇀)⊆ (⇀i) for every profile⇀.
Thus, under an oligarchic rule FC the agents in C, and only those, have veto powers. With the
exception of the unanimity rule, a quota rule does not grant veto powers to any agent.
3.2 Axioms
Next, we introduce some basic axioms, encoding intuitively desirable properties of an aggregation rule F:
Definition 8. F is anonymous, if F(⇀) = F(⇀pi(1), . . . ,⇀pi(n)) holds for all profiles ⇀ and all permu-
tations pi : N → N.
Definition 9. F is neutral, if N⇀att = N
⇀
att′ implies att ∈ F(⇀)⇔ att
′ ∈ F(⇀) for all profiles ⇀ and all
attacks att, att′.
Definition 10. F is independent, if N⇀att = N
⇀′
att implies att ∈ F(⇀)⇔ att ∈ F(⇀
′) for all profiles ⇀,
⇀′ and all attacks att.
Definition 11. F is monotonic, if N⇀att ⊆N
⇀′
att (together with N
⇀
att′ =N
⇀′
att′ for all attacks att
′ 6= att) implies
att ∈ F(⇀)⇒ att ∈ F(⇀′) for all profiles ⇀,⇀′ and all attacks att.
Definition 12. F is unanimous, if F(⇀)⊇ (⇀1)∩·· ·∩ (⇀n) holds for all profiles⇀ = (⇀1, . . . ,⇀n).
Definition 13. F is grounded, if F(⇀)⊆ (⇀1)∪ ·· ·∪ (⇀n) holds for all profiles ⇀ = (⇀1, . . . ,⇀n).
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Anonymity is a symmetry (and thus fairness) requirement regarding agents, and neutrality is a sym-
metry requirement regarding attacks. Independence expresses that whether an attack is accepted should
only depend on its supporters. Monotonicity says that additional support for an accepted attack should
never cause it to be rejected. Unanimity postulates that an attack supported by everyone must be accepted,
while groundedness means that only attacks with at least one supporter can be collectively accepted.3
We observe that all quota rules and all oligarchic rules are easily seen to be unanimous, grounded,
neutral, independent, and monotonic. The quota rules furthermore are also anonymous. In fact, it is not
difficult to adapt a well-known result from judgment aggregation to our setting [10], so as to see that the
quota rules are the only aggregation rules that satisfy all of these six axioms (see also [14]).
3.3 Preservation of Semantic Properties
Typically, agents will disagree about which attacks are justified. But even then, there may be high-
level agreement on certain features. For example, they may all agree that, under a particular semantics,
argument A is acceptable. Whenever we observe such agreement on semantic features in a profile, we
would like those features to be preserved under aggregation. Thus, for our example, under the same
semantics, we would like A to be acceptable also in the argumentation framework computed by our
aggregation rule. In other words, we are interested in the preservation of properties of argumentation
frameworks under aggregation. Formally, an AF-property P ⊆ 2Arg×Arg is simply the set of all attack-
relations on Arg that satisfy P. But in the interest of readability, we write P(⇀) rather than (⇀) ∈ P.
Definition 14. Let F be an aggregation rule and let P be an AF-property. We say that F preserves P, if
for every profile⇀ we have that P(⇀i) being the case for all agents i ∈ N implies P(F(⇀)).
This notion of preservation is known under the name of collective rationality in other parts of social
choice theory [3, 14, 20].
We now review the specific AF-properties for which we study preservation in this paper. Two of them
we have already introduced in Section 2, namely acyclicity and coherence. They are attractive properties,
because—if satisfied by an argumentation framework—they reduce our dependence on a specific choice
of semantics, thereby making decisions less controversial.
Recall that the grounded extension may be empty, i.e., this semantics may not suggest any arguments
to be accepted. Thus, argumentation frameworks that satisfy the AF-property of nonemptiness of the
grounded extension are of particular interest.
Let A ∈ Arg be one of the arguments under consideration. Then, for any given argumentation frame-
work, A may or may not belong to the grounded extension. Thus, every A ∈ Arg defines an AF-property,
namely the property of membership of A in the grounded extension, i.e., of acceptance of A under the
grounded semantics. We say that F preserves argument acceptability under the grounded semantics, if
it is the case that, for all arguments A ∈ Arg, whenever A belongs to the grounded extension of 〈Arg,⇀i〉
for all i∈N, then A also belongs to the grounded extension of 〈Arg,F(⇀)〉. For the stable, preferred, and
complete semantics, we require a more refined definition, given that extensions under these semantics
need not be unique. We say that F preserves argument acceptability under the stable semantics, if it is
the case that, for all arguments A∈ Arg, whenever A belongs to some stable extension of 〈Arg,⇀i〉 for all
agents i ∈ N, then A also belongs to some stable extension of 〈Arg,F(⇀)〉. The corresponding concepts
for the preferred and the complete semantics are defined accordingly.4
3Note that, in line with the existing literature in argumentation theory on the one hand and social choice theory on the other,
we use the term “grounded” in two unrelated ways in this paper (grounded extensions vs. grounded aggregation rules).
4A further distinction between acceptability in some extension and acceptability in all extensions would be possible. We
leave the investigation of this issue to future work.
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Rather than just preserving the acceptability status of a single argument, we may also be interested in
preserving entire extensions. For example, we say that F preserves extensions under the stable semantics,
if it is the case that, for all sets ∆⊆ Arg, whenever ∆ is a stable extension of 〈Arg,⇀i〉 for all agents i∈N,
then ∆ is also a stable extension of 〈Arg,F(⇀)〉. Again, the corresponding concept can also be defined
for the other three semantics. Similarly, we say that F preserves conflict-freeness, if it is the case that, for
all sets ∆ ⊆ Arg, whenever ∆ is conflict-free in 〈Arg,⇀i〉 for all agents i ∈ N, then ∆ is also conflict-free
〈Arg,F(⇀)〉. Finally, preservation of admissibility is defined accordingly.
To summarise, we have identified the following AF-properties that, in case all agents agree on one
of them being satisfied, we would like to see preserved under aggregation:
• acyclicity and coherence (reducing semantic ambiguity),
• nonemptiness of the grounded extension (enabling a sceptical approach to argument evaluation),
• argument acceptability under different semantics (allowing for agreement on arguments even in
the face of disagreement on the attacks between them), and
• being an extension under one of the four semantics or being either a conflict-free or an admissible
set (also allowing for semantic agreement despite disagreement on attacks).
Example 2. Consider again the profile of Figure 1 and recall that the (weak or strict) majority rule
will return the argumentation framework with A⇀ B, B⇀C, and C⇀ A. Thus, the majority rule does
not preserve acyclicity.5 What about some of the other AF-properties? The grounded extension of AF1
is {A,C,D}, that of AF2 is {B,D}, that of AF3 is {A,D}, and that of the majority outcome is {D}.
Thus, preservation of both nonemptiness of the grounded extension and argument acceptability under
the grounded semantics are not violated by this particular example (which, of course, is not to say that
they might not be violated for other profiles). △
4 Preservation Results
In this section, we present our results on the preservation of semantic properties under aggregation. We
begin with argument acceptability, and then turn to the various properties of sets of arguments, and
eventually to acyclicity and coherence.
4.1 Acceptability of an Argument
Our first result is going to demonstrate that preserving acceptability of an argument when using a “sim-
ple” aggregation rule is impossible, unless we are willing to use a dictatorship. This is true under any of
the four semantics. To prove this result—and some of those that follow—we are going to use a technique
developed by Endriss and Grandi [14] for the more general framework of graph aggregation, which in
turn has been inspired by the seminal work on preference aggregation of Arrow [3]. It amounts to show-
ing that, under certain assumptions, the collection of coalitions of agents that are sufficiently powerful to
force collective acceptance of an attack must form an ultrafilter.
Using our present terminology, Endriss and Grandi [14, Theorem 18] show that, for |Arg| > 3, any
unanimous, grounded, neutral, and independent aggregation rule F that preserves some AF-property P
must be a dictatorship whenever P belongs to what they call the family of implicative and disjunctive
properties. P is implicative if there exist a set Att⊆ Arg×Arg of attacks and three attacks att1,att2,att3 ∈
Arg×Arg\Att such that, for any S ⊆ {att1,att2,att3}, we have P(Att∪S) if and only if S 6= {att1,att2}.
5This observation is closely related to the famous Condorcet Paradox in the theory of preference aggregation [21].
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Thus, P should require that, in the context of Att, accepting att1 and att2 implies accepting att3 (and all
seven patterns of acceptance consistent with that requirement are possible). P is disjunctive if there exist
Att ⊆ Arg×Arg and att1,att2 ∈ Arg×Arg\Att such that, for any S ⊆ {att1,att2}, we have P(Att∪ S) if
and only if S 6= /0. Thus, P should require that, given Att, we must accept at least one of att1 and att2 (and
all three patterns of acceptance consistent with that requirement are possible).6
In the appendix, we show that, under any of the four semantics and for |Arg| > 4, the property of
argument acceptability is both implicative and disjunctive. Thus, we obtain the following impossibility
result, showing that there exists no aggregation rule that satisfies all of our requirements:
Theorem 1. Let P be the property of argument acceptability under either the grounded, the stable, the
preferred, or the complete semantics. For |Arg|> 4, any unanimous, grounded, neutral, and independent
aggregation rule F that preserves P must be a dictatorship.
This is bad news. For scenarios with |Arg| 6 3, we can do better and show that also the nomination
rule preserves argument acceptability. In the interest of space, we omit the details and also do not discuss
such boundary conditions for our remaining results.
4.2 Conflict-Freeness and Admissibility
Argument acceptability is a property that relates to a single argument. Next, we turn to properties that
relate to sets of arguments. Our most basic property of sets of arguments is preserved under essentially
all reasonable aggregation rules:
Theorem 2. Every aggregation rule F that is grounded preserves conflict-freeness.
Proof. Let F be an aggregation rule that is grounded. Consider any set ∆ ⊆ Arg and any profile ⇀ =
(⇀1, . . . ,⇀n) such that ∆ is conflict-free in 〈Arg,⇀i〉 for all i ∈ N. For the sake of contradiction, assume
∆ is not conflict-free in 〈Arg,F(⇀)〉, i.e., there exist two arguments A,B∈ ∆ such that (A⇀ B)∈ F(⇀).
Due to the groundedness of F , there then must be at least one agent i ∈ N such that also A⇀i B, i.e., ∆
is not conflict-free in 〈Arg,⇀i〉 either, in contradiction to our original assumption.
For admissibility, we obtain a significantly less broad but still positive result. It shows that there
exists a reasonable rule that preserves the admissibility of arbitrary sets of arguments:
Theorem 3. For |Arg|> 4, the only unanimous, grounded, anonymous, neutral, independent, and mono-
tonic aggregation rule F that preserves admissibility is the nomination rule.
Proof. We first show that the nomination rule indeed preserves admissibility. So let F be the nomination
rule. Consider any set ∆ ⊆ Arg and any profile ⇀ = (⇀1, . . . ,⇀n) such that ∆ is admissible in AFi =
〈Arg,⇀i〉 for all i ∈ N. For the sake of contradiction, assume ∆ is not admissible in 〈Arg,F(⇀)〉, i.e.,
there is an argument A ∈ ∆ that, in F(⇀), is attacked by an argument B ∈ Arg\∆ and there does not exist
a C ∈ ∆ such that (C⇀ B) ∈ F(⇀). As (B⇀ A) ∈ F(⇀) and as F is grounded, we must have B⇀i A
for some i ∈ N. And as there does not exist a C ∈ ∆ such that (C⇀ A) ∈ F(⇀), given the definition of
the nomination rule, there cannot exist an argument C ∈ ∆ such thatC⇀i A for that same agent i. Hence,
∆ is not admissible in AFi, in contradiction to our original assumption.
We still need to show that there can be no other aggregation rule than the nomination rule that
preserves admissibility and that satisfies all of the axioms mentioned in the statement of Theorem 3.
6Our definitions of implicativeness and disjunctiveness are special cases of the more general definitions given by Endriss
and Grandi [14]. They simplify exposition and are sufficient for our purposes here.
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Figure 2: Profile used in the proof of Theorem 3.
By the characterisation result for quota rules due to Dietrich and List [10] in the context of judgment
aggregation, which has been adapted to graph aggregation by Endriss and Grandi [14] and which we
have briefly recalled near the end of Section 3.1, this claim is equivalent to the claim that no quota rule
Fq with a quota q> 1 always preserves admissibility. So let us prove this.
Consider the generic profile shown in Figure 2 (and note that q> 1 ensures q−1> 0, i.e., there is at
least one agent of the first kind). The set {A,B,C} is admissible in all argumentation frameworks in such
a profile. But when we aggregate using a quota rule Fq with a quota q > 1, we obtain an argumentation
framework with a single attack D⇀ A, which means that A cannot be part of any admissible set. Hence,
no such rule can preserve admissibility.
4.3 The Property of Being an Extension
We continue our examination of properties relating to sets of arguments and turn to the property of being
an extension of a given argumentation framework. The following result can again be proved by reference
to the result of Endriss and Grandi [14]:
Theorem 4. For |Arg|> 5, any unanimous, grounded, neutral, and independent aggregation rule F that
preserves grounded extensions must be a dictatorship.
The required proof of the fact that all three properties are both implicative and disjunctive can be
found in the appendix. We conjecture that Theorem 4 can be extended to the preferred and the com-
plete semantics. The added difficulty lies in the fact that these semantics admit multiple extensions.
Interestingly, for stable extensions we obtain a much more positive result:
Proposition 5. The nomination rule preserves stable extensions.
Proof. Let F be the nomination rule. Consider any set ∆ ⊆ Arg and any profile⇀ = (⇀1, . . . ,⇀n) such
that ∆ is stable in 〈Arg,⇀i〉 for all i ∈ N. According to Theorem 2, given that F is grounded, F preserves
conflict-freeness. Thus, ∆ is conflict-free in 〈Arg,F(⇀)〉.
What remains to be shown is that ∆ attacks every argument B ∈ Arg\∆. In case ∆ = Arg, the claim
holds vacuously. Otherwise, consider an arbitrary argument B ∈ Arg \∆. We need to show that B is
attacked by some argument in ∆ in F(⇀). Take the argumentation framework AFi = 〈Arg,⇀i〉 for some
i ∈ N. As ∆ is stable in AFi by assumption, there exists an argument A ∈ ∆ such that A⇀i B. As F is the
nomination rule, we also get (A⇀ B) ∈ F(⇀) as claimed.
4.4 Nonemptiness of the Grounded Extension
We have seen that preserving grounded extensions is impossible for reasonable aggregation rules (see
Theorem 4). What about the seemingly less demanding requirement of at least preserving nonemptiness
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of the grounded extension? The good news is that we can do better for this property. For instance, it
is easy to check that the unanimity rule preserves nonemptiness of the grounded extension. Still, as we
shall see next, we cannot do much better: only rules that grant veto powers to some agents will work.
Recall that the grounded extension is nonempty if an only if at least one argument is not attacked
by any other argument. Thus, this AF-property is about the absence of attacks, while the technique
we employed to prove Theorem 4 (and Theorem 1) exploits the presence of certain attacks. We are
now going to present our preservation result regarding the nonemptiness of the grounded extension as
a corollary to a more general theorem about the preservation of AF-properties that require the absence
of certain attacks. Let k ∈ N. Let us call an AF-property P k-exclusive if there exist k distinct attacks
att1, . . . ,attk ∈ Arg×Arg such that (i) {att1, . . . ,attk} ⊆ (⇀) for no attack-relation ⇀ with P(⇀), and
(ii) for every S ( {att1, . . . ,attk} there exists an attack-relation ⇀ such that S ⊆ (⇀) and P(⇀). Thus,
you cannot accept all k attacks, but you should be able to accept any proper subset of them. We are able
to prove the following powerful theorem (recall that n is the number of agents in N):
Theorem 6. Let k > n and let P be an AF-property that is k-exclusive. Then under any neutral and
independent aggregation rule F that preserves P at least one agent must have veto powers.
Proof. Let k > n, let P be an AF-property that is k-exclusive, and let F be an aggregation rule that is
neutral and independent. We need to show that, if F preserves P, then F must give some agents the
power to veto the collective acceptance of attacks.
First, observe that, if an aggregation rule F is neutral and independent, then we can describe F by
listing all the coalitions C ⊆ N for which it is the case that, whenever exactly the agents in C support an
attack att, then att must be collectively accepted. Indeed, independence says that acceptance of an attack
should only depend on its supporters, and neutrality adds that this dependence must be the same for all
attacks. More formally, there exists a family of winning coalitions W ⊆ 2N such that, for all profiles ⇀
and all potential attacks att ∈ Arg×Arg, the following relationship holds:
att ∈ F(⇀) if and only if N⇀att ∈W
Recall that i ∈ N having veto powers under F means that F(⇀)⊆ (⇀i) for every profile⇀. We can
now show that an agent i ∈ N has veto powers, if she is a member of all winning coalitions:
i ∈
⋂
C∈W
C implies F(⇀)⊆ (⇀i) for all profiles⇀
If
⋂
C∈W C = /0, then the above claim holds vacuously. Otherwise, take any attack att ∈ F(⇀). As
att got accepted, N⇀att must be a winning coalition, i.e., N
⇀
att ∈ W and therefore i ∈ N
⇀
att . But this is just
another way of saying att ∈ (⇀i), so we are done.
Next, we are going to show that the fact that F preserves the k-exclusive AF-property P implies that
the intersection of any k winning coalitions must be nonempty:
C1∩ ·· ·∩Ck 6= /0 for all C1, . . . ,Ck ∈W
For the sake of contradiction, assume there do exist winning coalitions C1, . . . ,Ck ∈ W such that
C1 ∩ ·· · ∩Ck = /0. We construct a profile ⇀ = (⇀1, . . . ,⇀n) with P(⇀i) for all i ∈ N as follows: for
every j ∈ {1, . . . ,k}, exactly the agents in C j accept attack att j (for all other attacks, it is irrelevant
which agents accept them). As no agent is a member of all k winning coalitions, no agent accepts all
k attacks, so this construction indeed is possible. However, as each of the k attacks is supported by a
winning coalition, they all get accepted, i.e., {att1, . . . ,attk} ⊆ F(⇀), meaning that the outcome does not
satisfy P. Thus, we have found a contradiction to our assumption of F preserving P and are done.
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Let us briefly recap where we are at this point. We know that F is characterised by a family of
winning coalitions W . We also know thatC1∩·· ·∩Ck 6= /0 for allC1, . . . ,Ck ∈W . We need to show that
some agents have veto powers, and we know that this is the case if we can prove thatC(1)∩·· ·∩C(ℓ) 6= /0,
where {C(1), . . . ,C(ℓ)} is some enumeration of the coalitions in W . Thus, we are done, if we can show
that C1 ∩ ·· · ∩Ck 6= /0 for all C1, . . . ,Ck ∈ W implies C
(1) ∩ ·· · ∩C(ℓ) 6= /0. We are going to prove the
contrapositive, namely that the following holds for some C1, . . . ,Ck ∈W :
C(1)∩ ·· ·∩C(ℓ) = /0 implies C1∩ ·· ·∩Ck = /0
In words, we need to show that in case the intersection of all winning coalitions is empty, then so is
at least one intersection of just k winning coalitions.
Recall that we have assumed k > n. We construct a set W ′ ⊆ W of k (or fewer) winning coalitions
as follows. Initially, set W ′ := /0. Then, for every j from 1 to ℓ in turn, add C( j) to W ′ if and only if the
following condition is satisfied:7 (
C( j) ∩
⋂
C∈W ′
C
)
(
( ⋂
C∈W ′
C
)
Thus, every additional C( j) is selected only if it causes the removal of at least one further agent from
the intersection. As there are only n agents, we therefore will pick at most n coalitions. Hence, we
will indeed arrive at a family W ′ of n or fewer—and thus certainly at most k—winning coalitions, the
intersection of which is empty. This completes the proof.
It now suffices to show that the property of having a nonempty grounded extension is an |Arg|-
exclusive property to obtain the following result (the proof of this fact can be found in the appendix):
Theorem 7. If |Arg| > n, then under any neutral and independent aggregation rule F that preserves
nonemptiness of the grounded extension at least one agent must have veto powers.
It is not difficult to prove that the converse holds as well: all rules that grant veto powers to at least
one agent preserve nonemptiness of the grounded extension.
4.5 Acyclicity and Coherence
Finally, if we apply our techniques to the properties of acyclicity and coherence, we obtain the following
results (the proofs of which can be found in the appendix):8
Theorem 8. If |Arg| > n, then under any neutral and independent aggregation rule F that preserves
acyclicity at least one agent must have veto powers.
Theorem 9. For |Arg|> 4, any unanimous, grounded, neutral, and independent aggregation rule F that
preserves coherence must be a dictatorship.
Thus, surprisingly, even though acyclicity is a stronger property than coherence, it is easier to pre-
serve under aggregation.
7By convention, let
⋂
C∈ /0C = N, i.e., the intersection of no winning coalitions is defined as the universe N of all agents.
8Theorem 8 was anticipated in the work of Tohme´ et al. [25], who make a similar claim, but without appealing to the
neutrality axiom. We stress that Theorem 8 cannot be strengthened by dropping neutrality. Indeed, there are rules that preserve
acyclicity, that are independent (but not neutral), and that do not give veto powers to any of the agents. An example, for
N = {1,2} and Arg= {A,B}, is the rule that accepts A⇀ B if at least one agent does and that accepts B⇀ A if both agents do.
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5 Related Work
In this section, we briefly review related work on the aggregation of abstract argumentation frameworks.
Coste-Marquis et al. [8] were the first to address this problem, but without making explicit reference to
social choice theory. Instead, they focus on aggregation rules that minimise the distance between the
input argumentation frameworks and the output argumentation framework.
Tohme´ et al. [25] were the first to explicitly use social choice theory to analyse the aggregation of
argumentation frameworks. Their focus is on the preservation of acyclicity and they show that qualified
majority rules (which grant veto powers to some agents) will always preserve this property.
Dunne et al. [13] define several preservation requirements on aggregation rules that directly refer to
the semantics of the argumentation frameworks concerned. This includes variants of what we call preser-
vation of extensions (“σ -unanimity”) and preservation of argument acceptability (“credulous acceptance
unanimity”). Their focus is on analysing the computational complexity of deciding whether a given ag-
gregation rule has a given property, rather than on the axiomatic method. In follow-up work, Delobelle
et al. [9] establish for several concrete rules whether or not they satisfy the preservation requirements
introduced by Dunne et al. [13].
While Endriss and Grandi [14] explicitly mention abstract argumentation as a possible domain of
application for the model of graph aggregation they develop, they do not present any technical results
related to argumentation.
Airiau et al. [1] introduce the concept of the rationalisability of a profile of argumentation frame-
works. A profile is rationalisable if the diversity of views it contains can be explained in terms of (i) an
underlying factual argumentation framework shared by all agents and (ii) everyone’s individual prefer-
ences. Thus, their work is concerned with understanding what kind of profiles a good aggregation rule
should be able to deal with, rather than with aggregation itself.
Finally, social choice theory has also been used to analyse the aggregation of different extensions for
one argumentation framework see, (e.g., [7, 24]). We note that this problem is different from the one
studied here and refer to the survey by Bodanza et al. [5] for a comparison.
6 Conclusion
Using a variety of techniques, we have attempted to paint a clear picture of the capabilities and limitations
of simple aggregation rules regarding the preservation of properties related to the semantics of abstract
argumentation frameworks. While the significance of this issue and the promise of social choice theory
for its resolution have previously been emphasised in the work of several authors [5, 9, 13, 25], this is
the first systematic analysis of its kind. Our results show that only the most basic of properties, namely
conflict-freeness, is preserved by essentially all rules. More demanding properties require either the
nomination rule, a rule granting some agents veto powers, or a rule that is dictatorial.
We stress that these results only apply to simple rules, in particular, to rules that satisfy the axiom of
independence. An alternative route, the one chosen by Coste-Marquis et al. [8], is to use distance-based
rules (which violate independence). Such rules can be designed so as to guarantee specific properties of
the outcome, so the question of preservation does not arise. On the downside, distance-based rules are
computationally intractable [15, 18, 19]. We also stress that our results are based on the assumption that
all agents report attack-relations over a single common set of arguments. Richer models, where different
agents may be aware of different sets of arguments, are clearly of great interest as well.
There are multiple directions in which to extend this work. First, our conjecture regarding the preser-
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vation of preferred and complete extensions should get settled. Second, one could study further proper-
ties of argumentation frameworks. We have already hinted at the possibility of distinguishing between
argument acceptability in some extensions (the property studied in this paper) and argument acceptabil-
ity in all extensions. Third, we should eventually go beyond the four classical semantics introduced by
Dung [11] and also consider others, such as the semi-stable semantics [6] or the ideal semantics [12].
Fourth, one could vary the axioms imposed on aggregation rules. The most immediately promising
direction here would be to investigate whether neutrality can be replaced by additional preservation
requirements, in analogy to results in preference and graph aggregation [3, 14]. Finally, it would be in-
teresting to investigate the strategic incentives of agents who are reporting an argumentation framework
to an aggregation rule and whose objective might be to get a certain argument accepted.
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Appendix: Remaining Proofs
In this appendix, we present the proofs omitted from the body of the paper. All of the proofs in this
appendix have the same structure: they show that a given semantic AF-property of interest has certain
meta-properties, for which a general (impossibility) result is available.
Proof of Theorem 1
Recall that, for each of the four semantics, we have to show that, for |Arg| > 4, the AF-property of
argument acceptability is both implicative and disjunctive. We are able to use the same construction in
all four cases. Let P be the AF-property of argument acceptability under either the grounded, the stable,
the preferred, or the complete semantics. Furthermore, let Arg= {A,B,C,D, . . .} be a set of at least four
arguments.
Let us first show that P is implicative. LetC be the argument under consideration. Let Att= {D⇀B},
att1 = B⇀C, att2 =C⇀D, and att3 = A⇀ B. This scenario is sketched in the lefthand part of Figure 3.
Now consider the argumentation frameworks of the form 〈Arg,Att∪ S〉 with S ⊆ {att1,att2,att3}. If
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Figure 3: Scenarios used in the proof of Theorem 1.
S ⊆ {att2,att3}, then C is not attacked by any other argument. If S = {att1} or S = {att1,att3}, then
C is defended by D, which is not attacked by any other argument. If S = {att1,att2,att3}, then C is
defended by A, which is not attacked by any other argument. Thus, in all of these seven cases, either C
is not attacked by any other argument or it is defended by an argument that is not attacked by any other
argument, i.e., in all casesC is acceptable under the grounded, the stable, the preferred, and the complete
semantics. On the other hand, if S= {att1,att2}, then {B,C,D} forms an isolated odd-length cycle. This
means that all of B, C, and D will be unacceptable under the grounded, the stable, the preferred, and the
complete semantics. We have thus found a set of attacks Att and three individual attacks att1, att2, att3
such that P(Att∪S) if and only if S 6= {att1,att2}. Hence, P is an implicative AF-property.
Next, we show that P is also disjunctive. Let D be the argument under consideration. Let Att =
{C⇀ D}, att1 = A⇀C, and att2 = B⇀C. This scenario is depicted on the righthand side of Figure 3.
Consider all argumentation frameworks 〈Arg,Att∪ S〉 with S ⊆ {att1,att2}. If S = {att1}, then D is
defended by A. If S = {att2}, then D is defended by B. If S = {att1,att2}, then D is defended by both
A and B. In all three cases, D is defended by some argument that is not attacked by any other argument.
Thus, D is acceptable under each of our four semantics. However, if S = /0, then D is attacked by C and
not defended by any other argument, which means that D is unacceptable under all four semantics. To
summarise, we have seen that P(Att∪S) if and only if S 6= /0. Hence, P is a disjunctive AF-property. 
Proof of Theorem 4
Recall that we need to show that, for |Arg|> 5, the property P of being a grounded extension is an AF-
property that is both implicative and disjunctive. In fact, as we shall see, we can show disjunctiveness
even in case |Arg| > 4. Let Arg = {A,B,C,D,E, . . .}. For the proofs of both properties, we focus on
∆ = {A,C,E} as the subset of arguments that may (or may not) form the grounded extension.
We first show that P is implicative. Let Att = {A⇀ B,C ⇀ D}, att1 = B⇀C, att2 = D⇀ A, and
att3 = E ⇀ D. This scenario is depicted on the lefthand side of Figure 4. Consider all argumentation
frameworks of the form AF = 〈Arg,Att∪ S〉 with S ⊆ {att1,att2,att3}, and for each of them the corre-
sponding characteristic function fAF. If S = {att1}, then fAF( /0) = {A,E}, f
2
AF( /0) = {A,C,E} = ∆, and
f 3AF( /0) = f
2
AF( /0). Thus, the grounded extension is ∆ in this case. Using the same kind of reasoning,
it is easy to verify that the grounded extension is ∆ whenever S 6= {att,att2}. On the other hand, if
S= {att1,att2}, then we get fAF( /0) = {E} and f
2
AF( /0) = fAF( /0), i.e., the grounded extension now is {E}.
Thus, for our argumentation framework to have ∆ as its grounded extension, we must insist that, if both
att1 and att2 are accepted, then also att3 is accepted. Hence, P is implicative.
Next, we show that P is also a disjunctive AF-property. Let Att = {A ⇀ B,B ⇀ C,C ⇀ D,D ⇀
A}, att1 = E ⇀ B, and att2 = E ⇀ D. This is shown on the righthand side of Figure 4. Consider
AF = 〈Arg,Att∪ S〉 with S ⊆ {att1,att2}. If S = {att1}, then fAF( /0) = {E}, f
2
AF( /0) = {C,E}, f
3
AF( /0) =
132 Aggregation of Abstract Argumentation Frameworks
A B
CD
E att1att2
att3
A B
CD
E
att1
att2
Implicativeness Disjunctiveness
Figure 4: Scenarios used in the proof of Theorem 4.
{A,C,E) = ∆, and f 4AF( /0) = f
3
AF( /0), i.e., ∆ is the grounded extension of AF. By analogous reasoning,
∆ is the grounded extension also for S = {att2} and for S = {att1,att2}. However, for S = /0, we get
fAF( /0) = {E} and f
2
AF( /0) = fAF( /0), i.e., the grounded extension now is just {E}. Thus, ∆ is the grounded
extension if and only if S 6= /0, meaning that att1 or att2 are accepted. Hence, P is disjunctive. 
Proof of Theorem 7
To obtain the claim as a corollary to Theorem 6, we need to show that the property of an argumentation
framework having a nonempty grounded extension is a k-exclusive AF-property for k = |Arg|. Recall
that having a nonempty grounded extension is equivalent to the property of having at least one argument
that is not attacked by any other argument. We are going to show that the latter property is k-exclusive
for k = |Arg|.
So let k= |Arg|. Take an arbitrary enumeration {A(1), . . . ,A(k)} of Arg and consider the set of attacks
{att1, . . . ,attk} with atti := A
(i) ⇀ A(i+1) for i < k and attk := A
(k) ⇀ A(1). Clearly, this set of attacks
meets our requirements: (i) if {att1, . . . ,attk} ⊆ (⇀), then ⇀ does not have the property of leaving at
least one argument without an attacker and (ii) for every S( {att1, . . . ,attk} there exists an attack-relation
⇀ with S ⊆ (⇀), namely S itself, that does leave one argument without an attacker. 
Proof of Theorem 8
Recall that, if we can show that acyclicity is an |Arg|-exclusive AF-property, then the claim follows
from Theorem 6. In fact, it is straightforward to show that acyclicity is a k-exclusive property for every
k ∈ {2, . . . , |Arg|}. To see this, consider the case where the attacks {att1, . . . ,attk} form a cycle, and
observe that the shortest (proper) cycle has length 2, while the longest cycle visits every argument exactly
once and thus has length |Arg|. 
Proof of Theorem 9
Recall that we need to show that, for |Arg|> 4, coherence is an AF-property that is both implicative and
disjunctive. Let P represent coherence and let Arg= {A,B,C,D, . . .}.
Let us first show that P is an implicative AF-property. Let Att = {D⇀ B}, att1 = B⇀ C, att2 =
C ⇀ D, and att3 = A⇀ B. This scenario is shown on the lefthand side of Figure 5 and is identical to
the scenario used in the proof of Theorem 1. Now consider argumentation frameworks 〈Arg,Att∪ S〉
with S ⊆ {att1,att2,att3}. If either S = {att1}, S = {att3}, S = {att1,att3} or S = /0, the only preferred
extension is {A,C,D}, which is also stable. If S = {att2}, the only preferred extension is {A,B,C},
which is also stable. If S = {att2,att3} or S = {att1,att2,att3}, the only preferred extension is {A,C}
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Figure 5: Scenarios used in the proof of Theorem 9.
which once again also is stable. Thus, in all seven cases, AF is coherent. However, if S = {att1,att2},
the only preferred extension is {A}, which is not stable, as B, C, and D are not attacked by A. We have
thus found a set of attacks Att and three individual attacks att1, att2, att3 such that P(Att∪S) if and only
if S 6= {att1,att2}. In other words, P is an implicative AF-property.
Next, we show that P is also a disjunctive AF-property. Let Att = {B ⇀ C,C ⇀ D,D ⇀ B},
att1 = A ⇀ B, and att2 = A ⇀ D. This scenario is shown on the righthand side of Figure 5. Con-
sider argumentation frameworks 〈Arg,Att∪S〉 with S⊆ {att1,att2}. If S= {att1} or S= {att1,att2}, the
only preferred extension is {A,C}, which is also stable. If S = {att2}, the only preferred extension is
{A,B}, which again is also stable. Thus, in all three cases every preferred extension is stable, i.e., AF is
coherent. On the other hand, if S= /0, then the only preferred extension is {A}, which is not stable, as B,
C, and D not attacked by A. To summarise, P(Att∪S) if and only if S 6= /0. Hence, P is disjunctive. 
